Wage dispersion is generated in a sequential search environment through heterogeneity in firm productivity along with an individual wage-effort tradeoff. For a given degree of TFP dispersion, the framework can generate any amount of wage dispersion. Calibrated to generate realistic gains from trade, it is able to generate the kind of wage dispersion observed in data.
Introduction
This paper provides a way to generate substantial wage dispersion as observed by Hornstein et al [2011] (henceforth HKV) with small gains from trade as imputed by Hagedorn and Manovskii [2008] (henceforth HM). As HKV make clear, matching observed wage dispersion in equilibrium models of sequential search over wages requires that the value of leisure for workers be low relative to their productivity. Only if unemployment is particularly unpleasant will workers accept low wage offers when a much higher one could be received at any moment. HM, on the other hand, find that to match the modest gains from trade that they obtain from calculating vacancy costs, the value of leisure should be around 95% of match productivity. This paper introduces disutility of work instead of value of leisure. As disutility of work can be made job specific so that it rises with the wage, the model generates substantial dispersion in wages while dispersion in utility is kept low. This obviates the requirement for large gains from trade.
HKV provide an analysis of the extent to which search based models of the labor market are consistent with observed wage dispersion. They introduce a new measure of wage dispersion, the ratio of the mean wage to the lowest paid wage in a market and find that, after controlling for all observable differences between workers, figures for the ratio of between 1.5 and 2 emerge from the data. HKV then go on to show that a simple sequential search model cannot be consistent with this observation. Even if they set the value of nonmarket activity to 0, mean/min ratios of no larger than 1.04 can be generated.
Models incorporating on-the-job search do better than the simple sequential search model but HKV argue that the basic Burdett and Mortensen [1998] model still generates insufficient wage dispersion. Adding human capital accumulation as in Burdett et al [2011] or wage-tenure contracts as in Burdett and Coles [2003] further increase wage dispersion but individual workers in these models are no longer observably identical. In any case, the approach taken here is to show how the sequential search model can be adapted to generate substantial wage dispersion and does not exclude other sources. Of course, some of the wage dispersion might be attributable to unobserved heterogeneity. HKV, however, point out that (as identified by Abowd et al [2009] ) around one third of residual dispersion can be attributed to firm effects which is the source of wage dispersion exploited here.
By comparison, HM find that the gains from trade in any match should be small. This is based on calculations of the initial capitalization cost of vacancies which are small relative to the present value of match output. They argue that the appropriate value of leisure, or non-market activity, is 95.5% of match productivity. Although the focus of their paper is understanding the movement of unemployment over the business cycle, the analysis they conduct in order to come to their conclusion with respect to the value of non-market activity does not rely on cyclical data. Their results are valid outside of their particular model.
A similar discrepancy to that between HKV and HM is found in Bils et al [2011] . They were unable to reconcile observations on wage dispersion and unemployment fluctuations in a single framework. Their problem stems again from the requirement for significant gains from trade in order to generate observed degree of wage dispersion. The aim here is not to address the cyclical movement of unemployment; my analysis focuses entirely on steady state. Rather, the point is to show that substantial wage dispersion does not need to be inconsistent with small gains from trade in these models.
So, the literature on wage dispersion requires that the gains from trade be large while measured gains have been found to be small. To reconcile these contradictory positions I make two basic modifications to a standard Moen [1997] type competitive search model. First, vacancy creation follows a one-sided search process. Entrepreneurial firms sample ideas according to a Poisson process. The ideas represent the total factor productivity (TFP) of the job when created. When the firm obtains a viable idea it acquires physical capital and looks for a worker. Because the ideas differ, the capital investments differ and so do the contracts that the firms offer workers. The second modification is that the value of leisure is replaced by disutility of effort. In models of search and matching the two entities are essentially interchangeable. Thus, in the absence of any value of leisure, a high disutility of work reduces the gains from trade between worker and firm while, a low disutility of work would be required for substantial wage dispersion. The main difference between disutility of work and value of leisure is that the former can be made specific to the match while the latter cannot. Here, higher disutility of work is associated with higher work effort. Because effort is observable and enters the production function, firms post wage/effort contracts and workers make what is essentially a standard labor supply decision.
The model is able to generate significant wage dispersion despite small gains from trade. This is because what matters to the workers is utility. At least under the functional forms used in the simulations, high wage jobs are more sought after than low wage jobs but, because the former require greater work effort, the differential in terms of the utility they provide is small. 1 The cost of effort can be close to the worker's productivity but low wage jobs are still viable because workers will take them. In fact, with constant returns to scale in production, the closer the cost of effort is to being linear in effort the greater the implied extent of wage dispersion. I show that the kind of wage dispersion measured by HKV is readily produced by a calibration that sets the cost of effort to marginal product of labor ratio close to HM's value of 0.955. 2 Indeed, if anything there is too much wage dispersion. The implied 1 Holzer et al [1991] found that among similar jobs, those that pay higher wages typically have longer applicant queues. 2 I actually use 0.952. dispersion in TFP required to generate the right level of wage dispersion is quite low compared to that which emerges from the applied industrial organization literature (see Syverson [2004] ).
To identify the source of wage dispersion in the model I sequentially shut down frictions in the idea generating process, variability in effort requirements, and labor market frictions. Without frictions in the idea generating process there is no wage dispersion. This might lead us to believe that TFP dispersion alone is generating the wage dispersion. However, shutting down endogenous effort almost completely kills wage dispersion too. Although effort choice alone cannot generate wage dispersion, it amplifies the TFP dispersion. Wage dispersion is considerably reduced, but remains significant, if labor market frictions are eliminated. This was to be expected. The labor market frictions simply support the dispersion in utility but the lesson from HKV is that utility dispersion should be quite small.
A common critique of models that involve competitive search over posted contracts is that posted wages are rarely observed. In a variant of the model, then, firms commit to and publicize only their capital stock. 3 The terms of trade (wages and effort level) are determined by Nash bargaining. Workers apply to the jobs knowing what the capital stock implies for the productivity of the job and therefore what the conditions of employment will be. It will be shown that under the Hosios rule (that sets the bargaining power of the firm equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies) the two models coincide. Because the bargaining power parameter assigns the shares of the gains from trade, it only really affects the level of unemployment in the model -wage and TFP dispersion are unaffected by it. This parameter can therefore be used to hit the unemployment rate calibration target.
3 As pointed out in Menzio [2007] competitive search requires both commitment to and advertising of certain aspects of the job (usually the wage). The benefit of using the capital stock is that it is automatically committed to in this environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the general environment. Section 3 considers efficiency. Section 4 looks at the implications of posted contracts while Section 5 looks at posted capital stock. The model calibration and simulations are discussed in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
General Environment
Time is continuous with an infinite horizon. There is mass one of ex ante identical workers whose life spans are distributed exponentially with parameter δ. Those who die are replaced by newborns so that δ represents both the birth and death rates. Workers are risk neutral. They get utility from the consumption good which they receive in the form of wages. Workers get disutility, c(e) from working with effort level e. The cost function c(.) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex with c(0) = c ′ (0) = 0 and lim e→∞ c ′ (e) = ∞.
There are also a large number of ex ante identical entrepreneur/employers who I will call firms. The firms can create vacancies by the following process.
At flow cost a, they sample ideas, z, at an arrival rate γ from a continuous distribution G. The support of G is (0,z]. Once a firm realizes an idea, z, it decides whether or not to pursue it. Pursuing an idea means that the firm acquires physical capital k. The cost of capital is normalized to 1.
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A firm with idea, z, specific capital stock, k, and matched with a worker who provides effort level e produces zf (k, e) units of the consumption good. 4 As with the advertising cost in the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, the costs a and k here can be viewed as utility costs to the firm or as physical costs measured in the consumption good. In the latter case it is assumed that firms each have a large number of on-going and potential projects and they pay for a and k out of the profits from existing employment relationships.
Ideas are therefore synonymous with match total factor productivities (TFP).
The function f (., .) is a standard neoclassical production function that has constant returns to scale, is twice differentiable, increasing in both arguments, concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. 5 Jobs are subject to destruction at the rate λ. For the purpose of simulations there will be a common discount rate r ≥ 0. To simplify the exposition I set r = 0 for the analytical part of the paper. 
Efficiency
Because workers and firms are risk neutral and the discount rate, r, is set to 0, the relevant social welfare function is the steady-state flow value of benefits minus costs. The benefits accrue from output, zf (k, e), for every active job.
6 This prevents any trivial equilibrium, in which no vacancies are created, from being stable.
Workers face a single cost source, c(e), the disutility of effort. Firms face two sources of costs, they have to finance the research, a, that generates the ideas that become values of TFP and they incur the cost of acquiring the capital, k, for job creation. If p firms are involved in research at any time the aggregate cost of research is pa. As there is a fixed number of workers and the infimum of G is 0, the Planner will not have firms run with every idea they get. Let z p be the worst idea that is not discarded and let J be the aggregate measure of viable jobs. Then, in steady-state, vacancy creation
The Planner will take advantage of the matching technology and use a continuum of matching locations, indexed by z, to send workers and firms.
After a job with TFP, z, and a worker match they remain at location z. Let θ(z) represent the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers, let v(z) be the number of vacancies per worker, let u (z) be the unemployment rate and let n(z) be the total measure of workers at location z. Then the total measure of jobs with TFP z is j(z) = (v(z)+1−u(z))n(z). In steady state, flow into and out of employment within each location have to be equal. The contribution to welfare associated with activity at location z is then
where k(z) and e(z) are the capital stock and effort level associated with location z. Now, given the matching rate for unemployed workers in location z is m(θ(z)) we have
Now we know that
and since job destruction is independent of z,
If Y represents the aggregate welfare contribution from all locations then
The Planner cannot hire more people than are in the economy. Thus,
So the Planner's problem is:
{Y − ap} subject to (1).
Because of the investment component of the cost structure, the objective function is not necessarily concave. However it should be clear that as long as a is not too large, the Planner will choose values of p that are strictly positive but finite. In which case z p ∈ (0,z] and for any z in
is an element of the interior of the positive orthant. 7 So, any solution to the Planner's problem satisfies the first order conditions.
Let µ represent the shadow price on the population constraint, (1). Then first order conditions with respect to e, k, and θ for any given value of z
7 Certainly e(z) and k(z) have to be strictly positive for the match to produce output.
Both have to be finite because the cost function c(e) grows faster than output even when k and e grow together. If θ(z) = 0, the planner would prefer to move workers to a different location where they are more likely to find a match. Conversely, if θ(z) is infinite, workers would better be moved from any location within the neighborhood of z to z in order to take full advantage of the jobs that have been created.
Equation (2) simply reflects the fact that effort is chosen once the capital stock is known. The ex post (after match formation) and the ex ante efficiency conditions coincide. In equation (3) the marginal cost of investment incorporates the opportunity cost of idleness for both the firm and the eventual worker. Optimal market tightness, θ, is determined by the Planner's allocation of workers across trading locations. The term zf(k, e) − c(e) in equation (4) is the instantaneous match surplus which for the Planner is the gains from trade. Increasing the number of workers in any one market has to offset the cost, µ, of taking a worker from another location.
The first order condition for z p implies,
where
For any z (i.e. without the subscript p), the right hand side of equation (5) is the total welfare gain from having a worker enter location z. The Planner rejects ideas when the gain associated with that value of z is is below µ the cost of taking the worker from somewhere else. Substituting µ into (4) and evaluating it at z p yields an equation used
In the location associated with the threshold value of TFP at which the planner pursues the idea, the marginal value of creating a vacancy equals the marginal cost of creating and maintaining it.
The first order condition with respect to p implies
The planner will have firms enter the research stage of vacancy creation up to the point where the returns from the expected retained technology equals the cost of doing the research.
Further implications of these equations will be discussed while considering the decentralized economy.
Posted contracts
In the decentralized economy, the set of active markets will depend on which aspects of jobs become common knowledge. Here, firms post a wage/effort pair, (w, e), which workers observe and use to direct their search. Markets are therefore indexed by ω = (w, e, θ) ∈ Ω = R 3 + . The set of active markets is Ω A ⊂ Ω. The equilibrium concept will be competitive search as developed by Moen [1997] . I seek steady-state symmetric equilibria. 
Value functions
Let V j be the value to a firm of type (z, k) of employing a worker in market ω = (w, e, θ). Then
where V f is the value to the firm of holding a vacancy in market ω. Thus
Solving for V f implies
8 Symmetry here means that all firms of the same type enter the same market and all workers enter any active market with the same probability as each other.
For a worker who enters the same market, let V e be the value of employment. Then
where V u is the value to looking for work in market ω. So,
Solving for V u implies
Equilibrium
Because workers are identical, for multiple markets to coexist, it must be the case that there exists some V *
Given z, and their capital stock, when firms decide which market to enter they take this indifference of workers as a constraint to their problem. Let
Then, let V v (z) be the value of pursuing an idea type z to a firm. Thus,
Firms will pursue any idea, z, for which V v (z) ≥ 0. They will drop any idea,
is the set of values of k associated with each z ∈ Z A , such that
As the infimum to the support of G is 0, for any V * u > 0 there exists someẑ for which V v (ẑ) = 0. It is immediate from the envelope theorem and equation (8) V v is strictly increasing in z so thatẑ is unique and Z A = [ẑ,z]. Free-entry to the market for ideas therefore means
For a given value of z, Problems (11) and (12) can be combined into
This demonstrates that the above environment leads to identical outcomes to one in which the firms also advertise their capital stock. Under a wage contract, the firm is residual claimant and investment is efficient regardless of the extent to which it becomes common knowledge. 9 By eliminating the wage from equations (8) and (10) problem (14) reduces to
The first order conditions with respect to e and k are identical to equations (2) and (3). The first order condition with respect to θ is
which coincides with equation (4) when δV * u = µ, the shadow price of the Planner's population constraint. The welfare contribution of an additional worker is that worker's flow value of unemployment.
As the results that follow rely on numerical analysis, it will suffice to show that any solution ω * (z, k * (z)) in the interior of the positive orthant is unique: (14) has a unique solution.
Proof. See appendix.
The value of V * u is obtained by setting V (ẑ) = 0 and the wage is obtained from equation (10). The value ofẑ is obtained from equation (13).
Notice that evaluating equation (15) at the optimum values of k, e, and θ implies that equation (13) is identical with equation (6). Under the functional form restrictions to be imposed for the numerical analysis the equilibrium is, therefore, unique and it also coincides with the Planner's allocation.
Furthermore under these functional form restrictions, equations, (2), (3) and (4) can be used to obtain the relationships of e, k, and θ with z. Indeed, if e, k and θ are chosen optimally, it is straightforward to show that, given z and µ (or equivalently V * u ), e and k increase with z and θ decreases with z. The wage also increases with z. So despite the increased effort required of high wage workers their jobs are the most sought after. Workers are indifferent across markets but they anticipate a longer search period in the higher wage, higher technology markets.
Posted capital stock (with ex post bargaining)
Here, firms post their capital stock, k, which workers observe and use to direct their search. In this arrangement, when the firm and worker meet, the wage and effort level are determined ex post by Nash bargaining. I seek steady-state symmetric competitive search equilibria.
Equilibrium
Nash bargaining over the wage and effort level of the job implies (e(z, k), w(z, k)) = arg max e,w
where V j and V e are obtained from (7) and (9) respectively and the continuation values, V f and V w for the firm and worker are taken as given. The parameter φ is the bargaining power of the firm. This leads to the usual outcome for the wage which divides the surplus,
and for effort we get
Combining these implies zf e (k, e) − c ′ (e) = 0.
This reflects the ex post efficiency of Nash bargaining. It also implies that with respect to effort, bargaining and posting with directed search are completely interchangeable. In the interest of conciseness, the remaining exposition incorporates a posted effort level. Markets are indexed by ξ ≡ (k, e, θ) ∈ Ξ = R 3 + . The set of active markets is Ξ B ⊂ Ξ. Substituting the value functions into equation (16) and solving for the wage implies
which is a weighted average of match productivity and the cost of effort.
Substitution into equations (8) and (10) yield
where the superscript B reflects that these were obtained from Nash bargaining. Firms wishing to pursue idea, z, solve
where V * u is the value to unemployment for any new entrant or laid-off worker.
Definition 3 An equilibrium is a list, Z
(ii) Ξ B is the set of values ξ = ξ * (z) such that z ∈ Z B where ξ * (z) are the solutions to problem (20)
Again, as the infimum to the support of G is 0, for any V * u > 0 there exists someẑ for which V 
Simulations

Functional forms and parameters
The numerical analysis uses the following functional forms:
The distribution G(.) is assumed to be uniform on (0,z]. The basic unit of time is 1 year. 10 So, the common discount rate, r, is set to 0.04. The job destruction rate, λ, is set to 0.2 to reflect the expected life of a job as about 5 years as identified by Cole and Rogerson [1999] . The death rate, δ, In their calibration strategy, HM find that vacancy costs are small relative to match productivity and that to generate measured levels of labor market tightness requires that the value of non-market activity be around 95.5% of the worker's marginal product. Here the corresponding target is on the ratio of the worker's cost of effort to his marginal product. Now, in either variant of the model, the first order condition with respect to effort (equation (2)) 10 As the model is cast in continuous time the choice of time unit is completely arbitrary.
The point is that by the choice of σ, the cost of effort to MPL ratio can be made arbitrarily close to 1. The value of σ is set to 1.05 which corresponds to a cost of effort to MPL ratio of 95.2%.
The parameters that affect vacancy creation are a and γ. 11 As outcomes depend only on a/γ, the value of a will be normalized to 1. The value of γ will be determined below in consideration of the calibration targets. The remaining parameters arez, the upper bound on z, andc, the scale parameter on the cost of effort function. Again, from equation (22) it should be clear that what will matter isc/z. I could normalizez to 1 but it is computationally simpler to setẑ = 1 and obtainz from equation (13). The value ofc will be determined below in consideration of the calibration targets.
There are three sources of information that can be used to pin down γ and c. First, a stated goal of the paper is to reconcile observed wage dispersion from HKV with the implied size of the gains from trade in HM. The latter has been fixed through the choice of σ. HKV measure mean/min residual wage dispersion values of 1.5 to 2. Abowd et al [2009] find that about one third of the residual wage dispersion after controlling for worker characteristics are attributable to firm effects. For this reason I choose a target for the mean/min ratio of 1.6 which is toward the bottom of HKV's range. Second, for consistency with the general search and matching macroeconomics literature the target unemployment rate will be 5.5%. Third, Syverson [2004] provides information on the dispersion of TFP across establishments within narrowly defined industries. In an attempt to account for factor utilization he includes materials and energy as well as capital and labor as inputs. He finds an inter-quartile range for TFP of 1.34 at the lowest. Of course both 11 Recall that the cost of capital was already set to unity.
energy and raw materials can be substitutes for labor. Syverson's use of these as proxies requires that they be perfect compliments to capital and labor services. To the extent that they are not, his number overestimates the extent of TFP dispersion.
Posted contract model
As both γ andc affect the cost of production, they do not have a differential effect on the relative magnitudes of the mean/min ratio, the rate of unem- In any case, it should be clear that there is no difficulty in obtaining the magnitude of wage dispersion reported in HKV. 12 Clearly an unemployment rate of 8.22% is significantly higher than the target value of 5.5%. This issue will be addressed when bargaining is introduced in the posted capital model. HM find that the flow capitalization cost of a vacancy is around 47.4% of 12 Forz/ẑ to be 1.34 the value ofc has to be 1.33 at which point the mean/min ratio is 1210 and unemployment is 63.6%. a worker's eventual productivity in the job. Here, mean capital investment is 0.4972 and the mean productivity of workers, zef e (k, e), is 0.2436. As the acquisition cost of capital is set to 1 the flow cost of capital, annuitized at the rate r + λ = 0.24, is 49.0% of worker productivity. Of course in this model there is also the entrepreneurial cost of vacancy creation which, annuitized over the match amounts to about 1.8% of worker productivity. 13 The total capitalization cost under this parameterization is, therefore, 50.8% of worker productivity which is reasonably close to HM's number of 47.4%.
In this model very small variations in TFP can generate large variations in wages, investment and output. The key is that the gains from trade in any match are small. That forces the cost of effort function to be almost linear (although still strictly convex). Combined with constant returns in the production function, any increase in investment induces higher optimum effort requirements which pushes up output almost one for one with the cost of effort. Ex post, workers prefer employment at high wage firms as the wage more than offsets the increased disutility of effort. As the value of unemployment is constant across all markets, workers trade the utility derived from jobs against the time it takes to get one -the unemployment rate is higher in the high wage markets. High wage jobs therefore fill more quickly. While it may be the case that high wage jobs such as one for an orthopedic surgeon may take longer to fill than a low wage job such as one for a tree surgeon, Holzer et al [1991] find that for jobs requiring similar skill sets, applicant queue lengths increase with the wage. Figure 1 plots the density of the wage distribution. As TFP, z, is uniformly distributed and firms match faster in high wage markets there are actually more workers earning high wages than low wages. However, convex- 13 The cost of obtaining any idea is a/γ = 0.0005. The probability that the idea is viable is 0.0284/1.0284. So the cost per viable idea is 0.0181. Annuitized over the match implies a flow cost of 0.0181×0.24 ÷ 0.2436 of the worker productivity. wages.
An issue here is how realistic is the implied dispersion in effort levels. The ratio of highest to lowest effort,ē/ê is 2.37. What is measurable, though, is the effect on productivity. Holding z and k fixed, this would imply a ratio of highest to lowest productivity of 2.37 1−α = 1.78. Bils and Chang [2003] provide some evidence on the extent of measured productivity variations from changes in hours. Changes from 12 to 8 hour shifts at the end of the 19th century found that over half of the loss in hours was made up in productivity increases. This implies productivity increases in the range of 25%. Here we have wage increases too, there is an additional efficiency wage component to the increased productivity so that a 78% increase from top to bottom does not seem implausible. Moreover, all workers get paid close to their marginal product. 15 That wages are strongly correlated with productivity is a common 14 A uniform distribution of z was used to highlight the effect of the model in generating the wage density. For a more realistic wage distribution I could have used a normal distribution of z. 15 The ratio of the wage to MPL is equal to 1 for z =ẑ. It declines monotonically with z and at z =z, it is 0.973. (see Abowd and Kramarz [1999] ) Abowd et al [1999] find that high-wage firms have higher productivity and higher profits. Figure 2 plots firm profits, z(f(k, e) − (r + λ)k − w, against z. More productive firms pay higher wages and are more profitable because they only need to provide the same continuation value, V * u that the lowest productivity firm does. High productivity firms operate in markets with higher unemployment rates which translates into a larger match surplus.
As firms extract 50% of that surplus their profits rise with productivity.
Source of wage dispersion
Three features of the model contribute to the degree of wage dispersion: frictions in the idea generating process, variable effort levels, and frictions in the labor market. Here I consider what happens when each of these features is removed.
To shut down the frictions in the generation of ideas requires taking the limit as γ goes to infinity. In that environmentẑ would approachz and there would be no dispersion in technology. Without technology dispersion, as long as the cost of effort function is strictly convex, there can be no wage dispersion.
To shut down the effort margin I set e =ē = 0.3042 so that there is a constant disutility of effort of 0.3220 which is the mean cost of effort in the simulated posted contract model. The parametersz andc are kept at 1.0284 and 0.808 respectively. Fixing the effort level kills wage dispersion -the mean/min wage ratio drops to 1.00009. Productivity dispersion is hardly affected at all: the value ofẑ rises to 1.0024 (from 1) so thatz/ẑ = 1.0259. After removing the effort choice, the model reverts back to essentially that of HKV. Even with significant productivity dispersion, absent some compensating differential, wage dispersion cannot be sustained. 16 No one would take a low wage job when waiting just a bit longer nets a much better one. Despite the slight drop in productivity dispersion, unemployment falls to 7.76%. This is because, the average profitability is higher a with fixed effort level. With variable effort, for a given technology, z, the increase in output associated with a given increase in capital investment is higher because there is a commensurate increase in the effort level of the worker. Much of the increased output, however, has to go to compensating the worker for the higher cost of effort. With a fixed cost of effort it is easier to increase the match surplus but wages cannot change too much because applicants have to be ex ante indifferent across markets. Because there is no effort variation the wage density is now upward sloping.
To shut down labor market frictions distinct markets indexed by wage/effort pairs are maintained but workers get jobs instantaneously. Consequently workers are indifferent across the jobs themselves rather than simply the markets they occupy. Again, keepingz,c and γ at 1.0284, 0.808 and 2000 respectively, the ratioz/ẑ becomes 1.0271 and the mean/min ratio for wages becomes 1.540. (The unemployment rate is, of course, 0.) So, even without utility dispersion, wage dispersion is substantial.
The upshot from this is that while frictions in the generation of ideas are essential for dispersion in any variable, endogenous effort is the main source of amplification. Indeed, consistent with HKV, labor market frictions per se do not contribute much toward wage dispersion.
Posted capital model
This model introduces another parameter, φ, the firm's bargaining power.
As the models coincide at the Hosios rule, the implied value of φ in the posted contract model is that of η, the elasticity of the matching function with respect to labor market tightness. Setting φ = 0.5 therefore gives the same results in both models. Holding the value ofz, as implied by the posted contract model, at 1.0284, the value of γ at 2000, the effort cost parameter,c, and φ can be calibrated to achieve a mean/min ratio of 1.6
and an unemployment rate of 5.5%. The implied values arec = 0.814 and φ = 0.712. (The value ofẑ rises 1.0013 to maintain the same value ofz.)
As increasing φ simply assigns a higher share of the ex post match surplus to firms it has a strong effect on vacancy creation, and thereby on the unemployment rate. It leaves other outcomes largely unaffected. Accordingly the value forc hardly changes between the models. The value for φ is consistent with the common finding that most of the match surplus goes to the firm but it is still low compared to the 0.95 used by HM. The value is very much in line with the 0.72 value used by Shimer [2005] . 17 In any case, HM's value of φ is chosen to match the cyclicality of wages. Dispersion in wages, the focus here, is largely unaffected by the value of φ.
Random Matching
Due to space considerations much of the analysis of the random matching model will be omitted. Random matching means that firms cannot make their technology, z, their capital investment, k, or their contract, (w, e), public knowledge. The arrangement considered here is that the contract, (w, e), is negotiated ex post by generalized Nash bargaining. 18 One concern is that as workers search across firm types (that become obvious once encountered) they may refuse to match with some firms. In particular, matches will not form if the ex post surplus is negative. However, as firms invest in capital up front and discount the future (at the rate r + λ) for any idea that is acceptable to firms the match surplus will be strictly positive.
As investment is made prior to market entry, there should be a hold-up problem that leads to underinvestment even at the Hosios rule (see Masters [2011] ). I set the parametersz,c and γ at 1.0284, 0.808 and 2000 respectively and set all the fundamental parameters to their standard values. The firms' bargaining power, φ, is set to 0.5 so the Hosios rule holds. Thenz/ẑ = 1.0297, the mean/min ratio for wages is 1.613 and the unemployment rate is 8.01%.
So, the behavior of the random matching model is remarkably similar to that 17 If I use φ = 0.95 and recalibratec to generate and mean/min ratio of 1.6 the implied unemployment rate is 2.15%. 18 If firms could commit ex ante to their contract, the economy would unravel as in Diamond [1971] of the directed search model.
One way to see why this happens is to look at profits as a share of output.
When matching frictions are important, the match surplus is a large share of match output. Since bargaining assigns a fixed share of the surplus to firms, profitability is a good measure of the role of search frictions in the determination of the allocation. In the posted contract model, the mean value of the profits to output ratio is 1.250%. With random matching this number increases but only to 1.292%; hold-up is not an important issue.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a framework for addressing the relationship between firm level TFP dispersion and wage dispersion. By focussing on disutility of work rather than utility from leisure it is able to generate the kind of wage dispersion observed by HKV while restricting the gains from trade to those measured in HM. Here, wage dispersion emerges due to differences in firm productivity and relies on a simple individual labor supply mechanism that permits high productivity firms to offer higher wages in return for greater effort from workers.
As a comment on HKV the results are mixed. By taking seriously the idea that individuals search over utility rather than wages the model easily generates the kind of wage dispersion that they maintain is inconsistent with sequential search. However, there is no sense in which this paper nullifies their results. Here too, labor market frictions per se are not responsible for much of the realized wage dispersion.
Appendix
Proof of Claim 2
To ensure applicability to the simulated model, the proof incorporates the discount rate, r. Consider the dual of (14), 
The objective function in Problem (24) is clearly concave in (k, e) which means that for any given θ there exists a unique solution, (k(θ), e(θ)) to the system of equations (25) Furthermore, if we impose (27) to be true then the first line of (28) becomes m ′′ (θ)(r + λ)(r + δ + λ + m(θ)) m ′ (θ) (k + V v (z)).
Under this restriction (28) reduces to
Then if m(θ) ≡mθ η , with η ∈ (0, 1) (29) further reduces to
In general, 
seen as a function of θ is downward sloping at any point for which equation (27) holds. As (27) is continuous in θ, it follows that after taking account of the effect of θ on k and e,
is quasiconcave in θ. The unique solution to (27) represents a maximum.
Proof of Claim 4
It is immediate from Problem (20) and equations (10) and (8) 
Substituting from equation (31) into V v (z) yields
